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We study the relationship between ethnic identity and labor-market 
outcomes of non-EU immigrants in Europe. Using the European Social 
Survey, we find that there is a penalty to be paid for immigrants with a 
strong identity. Being a first generation immigrant leads to a penalty of 
about 17 percent while second-generation immigrants have a probability of 
being employed that is not statistically different from that of natives. 
However, when they have a strong identity, second-generation immigrants 
have a lower chance of finding a job than natives. Our analysis also reveals 
that the relationship between ethnic identity and employment prospects may 
depend on the type of integration and labor-market policies implemented in 
the country where the immigrant lives. More flexible labor markets help 
immigrants to access the labor market but do not protect those who have a 
strong ethnic identity. 
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An intense political and intellectual debate is taking place in Europe around migration 
issues. Rather than being centered on the economic costs and benefits of such inflows, 
the debate has instead focused on the perceived costs and benefits of cultural diversity.
6 
This debate has been particularly intense after the series of violent disturbances in 
various cities and towns in England (e.g. Oldham, Leeds, Burnley, Bradford) in the 
spring and early summer of 2001, involving young British Asian men, and the riots in 
Paris’ suburbs in November 2005 where most of the rioters were the French-born 
children of immigrants from African countries. 
Though a range of potential explanations were proposed, two received considerable 
attention in political circles and also in the media. The first explanation put forward the 
lack of a shared civic identity that could bring together diverse communities. The second 
one was the adverse labor market outcomes of the ethnic groups, which experienced 
very high levels of unemployment.    
The attention paid to these factors (ethnic identity
7 and adverse labor-market outcomes 
of ethnic minorities) is relatively novel in Europe and does represent a departure from 
the long-standing debate which has tended to emphasize racial discrimination as the key 
explanation of ethnic disadvantage. The debate in the United States on these issues, at 
both a policy and academic level, is of longer standing. One theme that has emerged 
from the academic literature is that some individuals in ethnic groups may “choose” to 
adopt what are termed “oppositional” identities, that is, some actively reject the 
dominant ethnic (e.g., white) behavioral norms while others totally assimilate to it (see, 
in particular, Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998). Studies in the US have found, for 
example, that African American students in poor areas may be ambivalent about learning 
standard English and performing well at school because this may be regarded as “acting 
white” and adopting mainstream identities (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Wilson, 1987; 
Delpit, 1995; Akerlof, 1997; Ogbu, 1997; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Selod and 
Zenou, 2006; Battu, McDonald and Zenou, 2007; Bisin et al., 2009a; Fryer and Torelli, 
2010). In some instances, oppositional identities produce significant economic and social 
conflicts and can lead to adverse labor-market outcomes for ethnic minorities. This is a 
good example that can explain why a strong ethnic identity can lead to adverse labor-
market outcomes.  
In the present study, we contribute to such a debate by providing some evidence on the 
relationship between ethnic identity and labor-market outcomes of the immigrants in 
Europe. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), we are able to differentiate 
between first and second generation of immigrants and collect some suggestive results 
on the patterns of cultural and economic integration of immigrants in Europe.  
                                                      
6 Huntington (1996)'s notion of clash of civilization has served as a focal point for those who believe multi-cultural societies 
are simply not feasible. In his book, Sen (2000) has opposed these views. 
7 For definitions of “ethnic identity” and overviews on this issue, see Akerlof and Kranton (2010).   
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There are very few studies analyzing this relationship. Our contribution to this 
literature is as follows. First, we analyze the relationship between ethnic identity and 
employment outcomes for immigrants moving to Europe from non-European countries, 
using information on 20 different European countries. Second, we are able to 
differentiate between first and second generation immigrants, which enables us to study 
their cultural and economic assimilation patterns. Finally, we look at policy issues 
analyzing how integration policies as well as labor-market policies and conditions affect 
the relationship between ethnic identity and labor-market outcomes. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we give some figures of the employment 
situation of immigrants in Europe. Section 3 discusses the related literature and provides 
some theoretical mechanisms explaining the relationship between employment and 
ethnic identity. Section 4 describes the ESS data and details, in particular, how we 
identify the different generations of immigrants and how we measure ethnic identity. 
Section 5 empirically investigates the relationship between ethnic identity and 
employment outcomes of immigrants in Europe. In Section 6, we analyze the different 
integration and labor-market policies implemented in Europe and relate such policies to 
our research question. Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
2. THE LABOR MARKET SITUATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE 
 
In 2006, persons born abroad represented a significant portion of the workforce and of 
the employed population in European countries. There were however some important 
variations among host countries, reflecting differences in terms of immigration in 
general (Table 1). In Finland, and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
immigrants account for less than 3% of total employment. In Switzerland, by contrast, 
this figure is as high as 26%, and it is nearly 44% in Luxembourg.  
In most European countries, immigrants represented a larger share of employment in 
2006 than in 2002. The increase was particularly notable in Spain (more than seven 
percentage points), and also in Ireland and Italy (3.5 to 4.5 percentage points), and to a 
lesser extent in Austria, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg (about 2.5 percentage 
points). The Netherlands is an exception here: it was the only European country to see 
the immigrant employment share decline between 2002 and 2006 (down by 1.5 
percentage points). Thus, while about 11% of that country’s jobs were held by foreign-
born workers in 2002, this figure was only 10.3% in 2006. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In all European countries, immigrants find it hard to enter the labor market. The labor 
market in itself is decisive for how individuals who have immigrated are integrated in 
their new countries. Immigrants generally have a weaker position on the labor market 
than natives. This is clearly shown in Figure 1, which indicates the relative position of  
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immigrants on the labor market in European countries (and also in other OECD 
countries such as the United States and Canada). 
In all countries, with the exception of the United States and Hungary, unemployment is 
larger among individuals who have immigrated than for the native population. There are 
large differences between countries, however. In the Nordic countries and in Austria, 
Belgium and Switzerland, immigrants are over-represented among the unemployed by a 
factor of at least two compared to their share in the labor force (in other words, their 
unemployment rate is at least twice that of the native-born). In France, in Germany and 
even in the United Kingdom, those born abroad also suffer a notably higher rate of 
unemployment. On the other hand, in recent immigration countries (especially Greece 
and Portugal), place of birth makes little difference to the unemployment rate.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The motivating question of this article is why  immigrants have such a hard time 
entering the European labor market. There are many explanations but we will mainly 
focus on how ethnic identity and integration as well as labor-market policies in Europe 
can affect this outcome. In the next section, we expose the theoretical mechanisms that 
can explain the negative relationship between identity and employment. 
3.  ETHNIC IDENTITY AND LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES: THEORETICAL 
MECHANISMS AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
There are in fact few studies that have analyzed the connection between ethnic identity 
and labor market outcomes for individuals with a foreign background.  
Even though the mechanisms are slightly different, there are some theoretical models 
that have analyzed the link between ethnic identity and education. Austen-Smith and 
Fryer (2005) propose a model where ethnic individuals are defined by two types: her 
social type, reflecting her compatibility to the group, and her economic type, reflecting 
her intrinsic ability or market potential. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) show that there 
is tension faced by ethnic minorities between signalling their type to the outside labor 
market and signalling their type to their peers: signals that induce high wages can be 
signals that induce peer rejection. Patacchini and Zenou (2006) develop a different 
model where ethnic students prefer to have friends of the same race (preference bias) but 
value white friends because their parents have higher human capital levels, inducing 
better grades. They show that having a higher percentage of same-race friends (measure 
of identity) has a positive effect of white teenagers’ school performance while having a 
negative effect on blacks’ school performance. Finally, Battu, McDonald and Zenou 
(2007) propose an explicit model where the relationship between ethnic identity and 
employment outcomes is analyzed. In this model, ethnic minorities are defined with 
respect to their social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and their attachments to 
their culture of origin (religion, language), and jobs are mainly found through social  
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networks. There are two types of firms: those which have a strong preference for hiring 
whites and those which are race neutral. Ethnic minorities must decide to totally or 
partially adopt the white culture or to reject it by anticipating the implications of this 
choice on their labor market outcomes, given that whites have a better social network. 
There are two countervailing forces. On the one hand, ethnic minorities would like to 
mainly interact with same-race friends and thus to reject the white’s norm (preference 
bias). One the other, interacting with whites is beneficial because ethnic workers may 
then benefit from the high quality of whites’ social networks since the latter do not suffer 
from discrimination. They find that ex ante identical ethnic workers can end up choosing 
“oppositional identities” (as defined above), i.e. some ethnic minorities reject while 
others conform to the white’s norm. Their results depend on the value of the intensity of 
peer pressure, the wage premium of being employed, and the marginal impact of the 
identity choice on the ethnic-minority unemployment rate. This paper can help us 
understand why having a strong identity can be harmful to ethnic minorities: 
discrimination and a lack of good social network can induce minorities to reject the 
white’s norm and not to search intensively for a job.   
There are some empirical papers that have tested the relationship between ethnic 
identity and employment outcomes. Pendakur and Pendakur (2005), using data from 
Canada, examine the effects of ethnic identity on the use of informal networks to obtain 
jobs and on employment itself. They find that for European ethnic minorities the strength 
of minority identity is positively related to the use of informal methods (friends and 
family) for gaining employment but there is no effect for “visible” ethnic minorities 
(those of non-European and non-Aboriginal origin). For “visible minorities”, ethnic 
identity is also associated with lower occupational prestige and this finding is not evident 
for white minorities. Mason (2004) focuses on the consequences of identification to the 
majority culture and skin color of Hispanic Americans for labour market outcomes. For 
Hispanic groups,  adopting a non-Hispanic white racial identity is associated with higher 
annual income and hourly wages. However, this is not sufficient to overcome the 
negative penalties associated with a dark complexion or a non-European phenotype. 
Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2006), Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and 
Constant (2007) investigate the connection between the different degrees of 
identification to the majority and minority cultures (i.e. integration, assimilation, 
separation and marginalization; see Berry, 1997) and the probability of being employed 
in Germany. They find no systematic differences in employment between assimilated 
and integrated men, but they do find differences between assimilated and integrated 
women, at the advantage of the latter. At the same time, the results show that the 
probability of being employed, independent of sex, is significantly lower for those who 
are separated and marginalized as compared to those who are assimilated. This can be 
interpreted as a strong minority identity not having any negative effect on the chances of 
being employed, given that it is combined with a strong majority identity. Just like the 
identification with the German majority culture can increase the probability of being 
employed, being employed might increase the feeling of affinity with German culture. 
Results showing that those who identify with the majority culture are employed to a  
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larger extent might simply be due to these individuals having had a good labor market 
situation in a historical perspective. First, this might have increased the probability of 
identifying with the majority culture and second, it might have increased the probability 
of future employment. In the same country-context, i.e. Germany, Casey and Dustmann 
(2010) study the formation of identity with home and host countries and the association 
between both identities and labor market outcomes. The uniqueness of their dataset, 
which is a long panel that oversamples individuals with a foreign background and 
contains information for both parents and their children on ethnic group identity, also 
allows them to study the intergenerational transmission of identity from a generation to 
the next. Their findings denote a strong transmission of ethnic traits between parents and 
children, as well as signs of a relationship between ethnic identity and labor market 
outcomes, although the effect does not appear to be particularly pronounced. Nekby and 
Rödin (2010) study the relation between cultural identity and employment in Sweden. 
The results show that there are only small differences in employment between 
individuals with an integrated identity and those with an assimilated identity. Those who 
are integrated have a three percentage point lower chance of being employed as 
compared to those who are assimilated. But individuals with the separated identity have 
considerably lower chances of becoming employed and an eight percentage point lower 
probability of being employed than those who are assimilated. The differences in 
employment between different cultural identities are a male phenomenon. The results for 
men are similar to those that apply for the whole group while the results for women do 
not show any systematic differences between the different cultural identities as concerns 
employment. The differences among men are small between the integrated and the 
assimilated identity while the separated identity has considerably lower chances of 
employment (9.5 percentage points) as compared to the assimilated identity. Finally, for 
the UK, Battu and Zenou (2010) undertake a simple empirical investigation of the 
relationship between an oppositional identity and employment in the labor market in 
Britain. Their results indicate that the social environment of individuals has an influence 
on their identity choice and that those non-whites who have preferences that accord with 
being oppositional are likely to experience an employment penalty. They actually have a 
seven percentage point lower possibility of being employed as compared to those who 
are not oppositional. There is also a cost of being against mixed marriages; people who 
care about whether a close relative would like to marry a white person also have a lower 
probability of being employed.
8 
All studies imply that there is a strong identification with the majority culture that is 
important in order to succeed on the labor market and that the degree of identification 
with the cultural background seems to be less important.  
So far, we have examined papers that only consider “subjective” measures of identity, 
not “objective” measures like intermarriage rates,
9 racial choice of friends, fertility rates, 
                                                      
8 See also Battu, Seaman and Zenou (2011) who investigate the relationship between ethnic identity and the efficiency of social 
networks in finding a job. 
9 Inter-marriage is considered to be a measure of social assimilation and also a factor producing it (Pagnini and Morgan, 1990).  
  7
gender gaps, etc. There is a literature that looks at these issues (Meng and Gregory, 
2005; Chiswick and Houseworth, 2008; Bisin et al., 2009b; Furtado and 
Theodoropoulos, 2009) and relates, in particular, these “objective” measures to 
employment, earnings. These papers also find that there is a penalty in terms of 
outcomes for ethnic minorities who have a strong identity as determined by these 
“objective” measures.  
In this paper, we investigate the relationships between the identity of non-EU 
immigrants in Europe and their labor-market outcomes. The main difference with the 
previous studies is that we will use data on most of the 25 European countries (and not 
on only one country) and, as a result, be able to draw some general policy implications 
for Europe. The drawback is that the information on some variables is not as good as in 
the country-specific dataset used in the studies discussed above. 
 
4. DATA  
 
We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a European Union 
funded survey conducted in most European countries every two years, starting from 
2002. The questionnaire comprises ‘core’ items (which are repeated in all rounds) 
aiming at monitoring change and continuity in a wide range of socio-economic, socio-
political, socio-psychological and socio-demographic variables and ‘rotating’ items 
(which vary from round to round) aiming instead at deepening the understanding of 
some special topics. A supplementary questionnaire is also administered to all 
respondents, asking questions on human values.
10 In particular, the ESS contains 
information on the country of birth of both the respondent and the parents, which allows 
us to precisely identify the immigrants as well as to distinguish between first and second 
generation of immigrants. It does not, however, oversample the individuals with a 
foreign background. As a result, the limited sizes of the immigrant sample in the 
different European countries do not allow us to differentiate immigrants by ethnic 
groups. We reduce the heterogeneity within the immigrant population in Europe by 
focusing our analysis on immigrants coming from non-European (non-EU) countries 
only. We classify the respondents as immigrants if one or both parents are born in a non-
EU country. We then define first generation immigrants if born in a non-EU country and 
second generation immigrants if born in the “host” country. We bundle the countries of 
origin by geographical area, following the classification provided in the first round of the 
ESS, where the information on the country of birth is limited to the continent of birth: 
“Asia”, “Africa”, “North America”, “South America and Caribbeans”, “Australasia”.
11 
                                                      
10 The European Social Survey is academically led and, as a result, has used a methodologically rigorous multinational design 
that guarantees representativeness. A slightly modified formulation of the main questions is also administered to a sub-sample 
of respondents in order to determine measurement errors and the reliability of the items. 
11 “Australasia” includes Australia, New Zealand, and neighboring islands in the Pacific Ocean.  
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We use the cumulative ESS data, which pools the common information from the first 
to the third ESS round.  It includes countries participating in at least two rounds, ending 
up with a total of 24 countries and roughly 125,000 individuals. Because we are 
ultimately interested in investigating the relationship between ethnic identity and 
employment prospects, we consider individuals between 16 and 64 years only. We also 
exclude countries for which the number of surveyed non-EU immigrants is particularly 
small (lower than 10 people). Our final sample consists of approximately 85,000 
individuals covering the countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and Ukraine.  Immigrants represent about 4 
percent of our sample, of which roughly 64 percent belong to the first generation and 36 
percent to the second generation. Immigrants mainly come from Africa (38%)- 
predominantly from Maghreb-, from Asia (37%) and South America and Caribbean 
states to a lesser extent (16%).  
The ESS provides information on different dimensions of ethnic identity. In particular, 
it contains direct questions about the “attachment to religion”, the “importance of 
following traditions and customs”, and the “language most often spoken at home”.  It 
does not contain, however, information on the relationship between ethnic identity and 
the identity of the “majority” group where this person lives. For example, Bisin et al. 
(2008) as well as Battu and Zenou (2010) use the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic 
Minorities (FNSEM) collected in 1993/94 by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), which 
deliberately over-samples ethnic groups and contains extensive information on various 
issues surrounding ethnic identity and preferences. For example, in this dataset, ethnic 
minorities had to choose between “Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree”, “Strongly 
disagree”, “Neither disagree or agree” to answer the following questions: “In many ways 
I think of myself as British” and “In many ways I think of myself as ….[Respondent’s 
ethnic group]”.  
We measure here the strength of ethnic identity for each individual using a composite 
index, which is derived on the basis of the answers to the questions related to the three 
dimensions of ethnic identity mentioned above. The first variable “attachment to 
religion” is taken from the direct ESS question: “How religious would you say you 
are?”, with a scale of 1 to 10, with 0 being “not religious at all” and 10 “very religious”. 
For immigrants coming to Europe from non-EU countries, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the attachment to religion is a measure of identity, especially for groups like 
Muslims, Sikhs and Buddhists where religion is a way of keeping traditions from the 
home country (Bisin et al., 2008).
12  The second variable “importance of following 
                                                      
12 In the case of the United States, it is a well-established that religion activities have an important impact on Blacks’ sense of 
identity. Indeed, the Black church is the anchoring institution in the African American community (Lincoln and Mamiya, 
1990; Myrdal, 1944). The church acts simultaneously as a school, a benevolent society, a political organization, a spiritual 
base, etc. Black churches are significantly more likely than White congregations to participate in civil rights activities. For 
example, using data from the 1979-1980 national Survey of Black Americans, Ellison (1993) shows that participation in 
church communities fosters positive self-perception of blackness through the interpersonal supportiveness and positive 
reflected appraisals of coreligionsists.
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traditions and customs” is taken from the ESS section on human values that asks the 
following question: “How much like you is this person? Tradition is important to him. 
He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.” The possible 
answers are:  “Very much like me”, “Like me”, “Somewhat like me”, “A little like me”, 
“Not like me”, “Not like me at all”, re-coded with a scale 6 to 1. Finally, our last 
indicator of ethnic identity “language most often spoken at home” is instead a 
dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the language most often spoken at home is 
different from the national language (and also different from English) and 0 
otherwise.
13,14  
The composite index of ethnic identity is obtained using a standard factor analysis 
which suggests retaining only one combined variable as an appropriate summary of the 
three basic indicators. It explains roughly 50% of the total variance. The factor loadings 
show that it is almost equally driven by “attachment to religion” and “importance of 
following traditions and customs” whereas “language most often spoken at home” 
contributes to a lesser extent. It has a standard deviation equal to one, which eases the 
interpretation of the results. 
5. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES  
 
Table 2 displays the immigrant to native gap in terms of identity, education and 
employment prospects, distinguishing between first and second generation of immigrants 
and regions of origin. We include as controls, when relevant, the level of education, 
gender, age, a quadratic function of age, years since arrival in the (host) country and 
(host) country dummies.
15 Table 2 reveals that first-generation immigrants have a higher 
level of identity than native Europeans, regardless of the region of origin. They also tend 
to be less educated than Europeans and, controlling for education, they have a lower 
probability of finding a job than native Europeans. There is, in particular, a statistically 
significant (negative) gap for those coming from Africa and Asia. Not surprisingly, 
immigrants from North America have a higher education level than that of native 
Europeans. This does not, however, translate into a higher employment probability since 
there is a negative (and statistically significant) gap with respect to Europeans, which is 
similar to that of Africans and Asians. Turning to the second-generation immigrants, 
only for immigrants coming from Africa and Asia we still find a stronger (and statistical 
                                                      
13 There is a literature that emphasizes the importance of English language fluency (Chiswick, 1978; McManus, Gould, and 
Welch, 1983; Borjas, 1994; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003) and religion and culture (Iannaccone, 1998; Lazear, 1999; Brown, 
2000) for the degree of assimilation and labor market outcomes of immigrants.  
14 In the ESS, there are other interesting questions related to ethnic identity, such as those asking opinions on, for example, if it 
is good for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions or if immigrants should be allowed to educate 
their children in their own separate schools if they wish. Unfortunately, these questions are only available in the first wave 
(special module on immigration), whereas we need to pool all 3 waves to get a large enough size of the immigrant sample. 
15 Employment prospects are measured using a dummy variable equals to 1 if the individual is in paid work (including self-
employment) and 0 otherwise. Unfortunately the ESS does not provide information on wages (only a proxy for total household 
income is available and it contains too many missing values). Moreover, we cannot perform our analysis by type of contract 
because of too small sample sizes for immigrants in paid work.  
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significant) sense of ethnic identity as compared to Europeans. Interestingly, this is not 
anymore true for second-generation immigrants whose parents came from North-
America, South America and the Caribbean, and Australasia. Moreover, the education 
level of the second-generation immigrants tends to be higher than that of native 
European, with a statistically significant (positive) difference for those coming from 
Africa and Australasia. This educational advantage does not seem to be translated into a 
higher employment probability.  In particular, the second-generation immigrants coming 
from Africa, which are one of the two groups with a significantly higher education level 
with respect to natives, show a significant penalty in terms of employment prospects. 
This could be an indication of discrimination. As noted above, these second-generation 
immigrants from Africa are one of the two groups that maintain a stronger sense of 
ethnic identity than native Europeans. This could also be an indication that there is a 
penalty in terms of employment of having a strong identity.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Let us now examine in detail this last idea: is there a penalty in terms of labor-market 
outcomes for a non-EU immigrant with a strong ethnic identity in Europe? We will 
investigate this relationship for both first and second-generation immigrants, controlling 
for the region of origin, country of destination and individual characteristics.
16 
Table 3 (panel (i)) contains the estimation results of a regression analysis where the 
probability of being employed is regressed on the strength of ethnic identity (as 
measured by our composite index), immigrant status (being first or second generation), 
and their interaction terms. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individual is in paid work and 0 otherwise. We control for age, gender, education, and 
years since arrival in the country. We also include region-of-origin dummies and host 
country dummies. The use of host country dummies is essential in this context because 
of the large differences between European countries in terms of institutions, especially in 
the labor market.  
We investigate whether and to what extent there is a negative relationship between 
identity and labor market outcomes when the strength of identity is measured relative to 
the native population, i.e. using the whole sample (specification (1)), and when 
considering the absolute level of ethnic identity, i.e. restricting attention of the sample of 
immigrants only (specification (2)), so that the strength of identity is measured in 
absolute terms while, for the second-generation immigrants, it is measured relative to 
their parents.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                      
16 Unfortunately, this further analysis cannot be performed separately by country of origin, destination and immigrant 
generation because of too small immigrant sample sizes.   
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In line with expectations, we find that the probability of being employed first increases 
and then decreases with age, is lower for females than for males, and is higher for more 
educated workers. We also find that, within the immigrant sample, the longer the time 
spent in the host country, the higher is the probability of finding a job. Focusing now on 
the identity issues, the results in column (1) (identity measured with respect to the native 
population) indicate that, in Europe, a one standard deviation increase in the composite 
indicator of ethnic identity (encompassing attachment to religion, attachment to 
traditions and language spoken at home) is, on average, associated with an employment 
penalty of about 0.7 percent, which is common to both natives and immigrants. Being a 
first generation immigrant, instead, leads to a penalty of about 17 percent while second-
generation immigrants have a probability of being employed that is not statistically 
different from that of natives. These results seem to indicate an economic integration 
process of immigrants in Europe.  
If we now look at our interaction terms, one can see that being an immigrant and 
having a strong ethnic identity is associated with a further decrease in the probability of 
being employed, which is statistically significant only for second-generation immigrants.  
When the sense of ethnic identity is instead evaluated in absolute terms (column (2)), 
we find that the employment penalty increases by more than five times. However, while 
second-generation immigrants have a higher probability of finding a job as compared to 
their parents, there is no longer an additional penalty for second-generation immigrants 
with strong ethnic identities. Taking these results as a whole, the picture seems to be that 
second-generation immigrants have a higher probability of being employed as compared 
to their parents. Compared to natives, there does not seem to be any difference in terms 
of employment. However, when they have a strong identity, their chance of being 
employed becomes lower than that of natives.  
Our analysis so far has revealed whether and to what extent there is a penalty in terms 
of labor-market outcomes for an immigrant with a strong ethnic identity in Europe, for 
any given level of education. To understand better these results, let us now investigate 
the relationship between education and ethnic identity and see if the negative 
relationship between employment and identity can be mainly explained by lower level of 
education. We report in Table 3 (panel (ii)) the results of a similar regression analysis 
where the dependent variable is now “years of education”. 
When the performance of the immigrants is compared to that of natives (column (1)), 
we find that having a strong sense of identity is associated to a lower education level. 
However, contrary to panel (i), it is now the first generation of immigrants with stronger 
ethnic identity that seems to be more penalized in terms of education. Indeed, when 
focusing on immigrants only (column (2)), we find that the penalty is mitigated for 
second generation immigrants with a strong ethnic attachment. Therefore, it seems that 
second-generation immigrants with strong identity encounter difficulties only in the 
labor market and not in terms of education.  
Let us now provide some further insights about the components of the composite 
indicator that are driving the results and get a better sense of the magnitude of these 
effects. For that, we now break down our composite indicator of ethnic identity by  
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considering separately “importance of religion”, “importance of following traditions and 
customs”, “language spoken at home”. Remember that “attachment to religion” is coded 
on a scale 1 to 10, “importance of following traditions and customs” on a scale 1 to 6 
while “language most often spoken at home” is instead a dichotomous variable taking 
value 1 if the language most often spoken at home is different from the national 
language (and also different from English) and 0 otherwise. We construct a dichotomous 
variable (importance of religion) taking value 1 if the reported value in “attachment to 
religion” is (strictly) greater than 5 and 0 otherwise and a dichotomous variable 
(attachment to traditions) taking value 1 if the reported value in “importance of 
following traditions and customs” is (strictly) greater than 3 and 0 otherwise.  
We then repeat the previous regression analysis of Table 3 for our sample of 
immigrants only by including each of the different indicators of ethnic identity as 
separate regressors. Table 4 contains the results for employment (column (i)) and 
education (column (ii)) outcomes. The results in column (i) reveal that a strong 
attachment to religion and not speaking the host-country language at home are the two 
dimensions of ethnic identity that lower the probability of finding a job whereas a strong 
attachment to traditions and customs does not seem to play a significant role. In terms of 
magnitude of the effects, being strongly attached to religion has a comparable effect to 
the one associated with speaking a foreign language at home (6.5 versus 7 percent less 
chance of finding a job). The results for second-generation immigrants confirm the 
findings of Table 3 (panel (i), column (2)). Indeed, while second-generation immigrants 
have a higher probability of finding a job as compared to their parents, there is no longer 
an additional penalty for second-generation immigrants with strong ethnic identities, 
regardless of the indicator used to measure ethnic identity.  
Interestingly, when turning the attention to education outcomes (column (ii)), we find 
that the relationship between education and ethnic identity comes from a different 
source. Contrarily to column (i), it is now a strong attachment to traditions and customs 
as well as language spoken at home that seem to play an important role. In terms of 
magnitude of the effects, immigrants strongly attached to traditions have roughly one 
year of education less than immigrants who are not attached to traditions. Again, the 
penalty of speaking a foreign language at home is similar (slightly more than a year). 
However, in this case, the results for the interaction terms with the second-generation 
dummy show a signal of attenuation of the effect in terms of language for second-
generation immigrants. This evidence thus suggests that our previous result in Table 3 
(panel (ii), column (2)) about a mitigation of the penalty for second generation 
immigrants with a strong ethnic attachment is probably driven by the language 
dimension of our indicator of ethnic identity. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Taking the results of our analysis as a whole, we find that the negative relationship 
between employment and ethnic identity does not seem to be simply explained by the 
relationship between education and identity. Factors specific to the labor market, and  
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different than those driving the association between ethnic identity and education, seem 
also to be at work. 
In light of Section 2 above, it could be the case that non-EU immigrants with a strong 
ethnic identity pay a penalty in the labor market because they are either discriminated 
against and/or because they have few contacts with the majority group, yielding a poor-
quality social network, and/or because they are rejecting the majority’s norms in the host 
country. These different theories are linked to each other because, for example, someone 
who has been discriminated against can react very negatively by rejecting the majority’s 
culture, which isolates him/her from individuals from the majority. We cannot test which 
theory prevails but it seems reasonable to assume that all play some role. In Section 6 
below, when we will consider the different types of integration and labor-market policies 
in Europe, we will be able to give some (imperfect) answers on this issue since a 
favorable labor-market access policy is an indication that discrimination is less severe in 
the country in question.  
One obvious problem with what we have done so far is that the strength of an 
individual’s identity may in fact be endogenous because of omitted variables and/or 
simultaneously determined with employment outcomes. Indeed, a lack of success in the 
host country labor market may induce or encourage some to adopt identities that are out 
of kilter with majority values. Dealing with this issue, especially in this context, is 
difficult. One standard approach is to undertake a two-stage instrumental variable 
estimation, where in the first stage the intensity of ethnic identity is estimated with 
appropriate instruments. 
Focusing on the non-EU immigrants in our sample, we instrument the immigrant sense 
of ethnic identity with the strength of ethnic identity in the country of origin.
17 This 
variable should be directly correlated with own ethnic identity (if, for example, a Muslim 
immigrant comes from a very religious country, then he/she is more likely to have a 
strong attachment to his/her religion than someone coming from a more secular country) 
but not with own employment probability in the host country. In particular, it should 
eliminate the portion of variance in the individual strength of ethnic identity that is 
possibly due to a reverse causality mechanism, i.e. the lower the probability of finding a 
job in the host country, the stronger is one’s ethnic identity. The two-stage least squares 
estimation results are contained in Table 5. The analysis shows a strong first stage F-test 
and a still significant and negative impact of the intensity of ethnic identity on 
employment probability at the second stage, suggesting that the causality points towards 
the assumed direction. Indeed, our strategy rules out the possibility that the strength of 
ethnic identity is simply an optimal response to the host country environment. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                      
17 We take the average of our measure of ethnic identity by region of origin.  
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6. INTEGRATION AND LABOR-MARKT POLICIES, ETHNIC IDENTITY, AND 
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES  
 
Our results so far seem to point towards a negative relationship between ethnic identity 
and labor-market outcomes for non-EU immigrants in Europe. As stated above, by 
rejecting the majority culture in the country where they live, immigrants might find it 
difficult to enter the labor market. We would like now to study whether this relationship 
between ethnic identity and labor-market outcomes is affected by the integration policies 
and labor market policies implemented in the host country where the immigrant resides. 
In other words, is there a lower employment penalty of having a strong identity in 
countries that have more favorable integration and/or general labor market policies and 
conditions?  
 
6.1. Integration policies 
 
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a survey on individuals and therefore contains 
no information on integration policies of the 20 European countries studied. We use the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),
18 which measures policies integrating 
migrants in 25 EU Member States and 3 non-EU countries. It considers over 140 policy 
indicators to create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to 
participate in European societies. MIPEX covers six policy areas that shape a migrant’s 
journey to full citizenship: “labor market access”, “family reunion”, “long-term 
residence”, “political participation”, “access to nationality”, “anti-discrimination”. Since 
policies are measured against the same standards across all member states, MIPEX is a 
“benchmark” tool to compare performance. This index varies between 100 (when 
migrants and nationals have exactly the rights in the corresponding policy area) to 0 
(when migrants have no rights at all). 
“Labor market access” measures if a migrant worker or entrepreneur is eligible for the 
same opportunities as EU nationals to work in most sectors. In particular, it takes into 
account if this migrant worker can count on help from labor market integration 
measures to adjust to the language and professional demands of the labor market (for 
example, if the state helps him/her to get his/her full set of skills and talents recognized, 
to access training, and to develop language skills that are critical for the job market). It 
also measures how secure a migrant worker is in his/her employment, if he/she can 
renew most types of work permits and remain living in the country and look for work, if 
                                                      
18 MIPEX is produced by a consortium of 25 organisations. Amongst them are universities, research institutes, think-tanks, 
foundations, NGOs and equality bodies. The MIPEX Group is committed to improving the quality of debate on migrant 
integration policy in Europe. The first edition of MIPEX was published in 2004, and this is the one we use. MIPEX is 
produced biannually to track the progress of integration policies in Europe over time. MIPEX is led by the British Council and 
Migration Policy Group (MPG). MIPEX is freely accessible and can be found at: http://www.integrationindex.eu/.  
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he/she loses her job. Looking at Table 6, one can see that Sweden performs best (with an 
index of 100) while, for example, Poland (25) and Denmark (40) perform poorly. More 
generally, labor market access in the EU is, on average, only halfway to best practice. 
Migrants are partially eligible and can take up labor market integration measures that go 
only halfway to best practice. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
“Family reunion” measures the country policy in terms of bringing families together. 
In particular, it measures how long it takes for a migrant to be eligible to sponsor his/her 
spouse, registered partner, minor or adult children and her dependent relatives, e.g. 
his/her grandmother. It also measures the administrative procedures and how easy is to 
bring families together. In particular, is it a fair, transparent, free and short process? Can 
a family member renew his/her permit and stay as long as her sponsor does? One can see 
that Sweden (92) and Portugal (84) have high index values while Austria (34) and 
Denmark (36) perform poorly. 
“Long-term residence” measures how many years as a legal resident it takes for a 
migrant to be eligible to become a long-term resident and full ‘civic citizen’. Again, it 
also measures if the process is transparent, free and short and if his/her application is 
refused or his/her permit withdrawn only if his/she is found guilty of either fraud in 
trying to acquire it or of a serious crime. It also measures if the migrant has the same 
access to education and vocational training as nationals, and if he/she becomes ill, 
injured, pregnant or homeless, he/she can rely on social security, social assistance, 
healthcare, and housing support. The countries with the most favorable policies are the 
Nordics (including Denmark), the Western Mediterranean, and the UK.  Ireland (39), 
France and Luxembourg (48) have the lowest scores.  
  “Political participation” measures if a migrant has opportunities to participate in 
public life which conform to Europe’s highest democratic principles. In particular, it 
measures if the state guarantees his/her political liberties to form an association, even a 
political one, to join political parties, and thus participate in civil society. It also 
determines if as a legal resident, the migrant can vote and stand for local elections, just 
like EU-nationals. Policies in North and Western Europe are on average slightly 
favorable, while those in Greece and Eastern Europe are unfavorable (Poland (14) 
obtains the lowest scores). 
“Access to nationality” measures how many years it takes for a migrant with legal 
residence to be eligible for nationality. It also measures if any of his/her descendents 
born in the country are dual nationals at birth. It also determines if being tied to the 
country by residence or by family are the sole criteria for becoming a national. It also 
measures if the migrant is allowed to choose whether or not to keep his/her original 
citizenship. From Table 6, one can see that eligibility for nationality has the lowest 
maximum and the lowest minimum score with respect to all the other dimensions. Most 
countries do not facilitate naturalization for first-generation migrants. European-born 
children most often face unfavorable additional requirements for becoming citizens in  
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their country of birth. Most oaths and ceremonies do not involve requirements that can 
exclude migrants from participating or receiving their citizenship. Partially insecure 
under the law, many naturalizing migrants can have their application refused or 
nationality withdrawn on many grounds, without any time limits. Only a few countries 
fully allow migrants to hold dual nationality. 
“Anti-discrimination” measures the anti-discrimination law in each country that helps 
guarantee equal opportunities in economic, social and public life for all members of 
society, including a migrant and her descendants. It also measures if the law punishes a 
wide range of actors who discriminate against a migrant in many ways because of his/her 
ethnic origin, race, religion or nationality, among other grounds. It also determines if the 
state helps the migrant to seek justice through strong enforcement mechanisms. Sweden 
(94) and Portugal (87) have high scores and this reflects the fact that the legal definitions 
of discrimination and the mechanisms to enforce them are slightly favorable across the 
European countries. A wide range of actors are punished for discriminating against 
migrants based on their race or ethnic origin. 
 
6.2. Labor-market policies 
 
One of the problems with the integration policies described above is that there are 
endogenous in the sense that the lower is the employment rate of immigrants in a given 
country the more likely this country will target specific integration measures to increase 
this employment rates. In other words, there is an obvious endogeneity problem here 
since the policy formulation in different European countries is determined in large part 
by the characteristics and number of their immigrants. In order to avoid this problem, we 
also consider general labor-market policies that are not specific to immigrants but still 
affect their employment outcomes. We consider three main policies in Europe: 
“minimum wage”, “strictness of employment protection legislation” and “trade union 
density”. 
Using data from OECD, we first collect for each European country the “minimum 
wage relative to the median wage of full-time workers”, that is, the ratio of minimum 
wages to median earnings of full-time employees - excluding overtime and bonus 
payments.
19 Indeed, for cross-country comparisons, data on minimum wage levels are 
further supplemented with data on average or median wages. Median rather than mean 
earnings provide a better basis for international comparisons as they  account for 
differences in earnings dispersion across countries. Looking at Table 6, one can see that 
a country like France has a very high minimum wage relative to median wages while 
other countries like Luxembourg and Spain have a much lower ratio. Other countries, 
                                                      
19 A national minimum wage is the minimum rate which by collective agreement must be paid in all circumstances for certain 
work or to employees of a certain category.  
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like for example the Scandinavian countries, have no legislation on a national minimum 
wage. For these countries the value of the indicator is set to 0.
20 Countries with high 
minimum wages should be less favorable to immigrants since the latter tend to be less 
educated and thus paid at the minimum wage. Indeed, higher minimum wages implies 
higher labor costs for employers and thus lower chance of being hired.   
We then use the OECD employment protection indicators, which are compiled from 
21 items covering three different aspects of employment protection: (1) “Individual 
dismissal of workers with regular contracts: this index incorporates three aspects of 
dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the 
dismissal process, such as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods 
and severance pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of 
dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, 
as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as 
compensation and reinstatement); (2) “Additional costs for collective dismissals”: most 
countries impose additional delays, costs or notification procedures when an employer 
dismisses a large number of workers at one time. This measure includes only additional 
costs which go beyond those applicable for individual dismissal. It does not reflect the 
overall strictness of regulation of collective dismissals, which is the sum of costs for 
individual dismissals and any additional cost of collective dismissals; (3) “Regulation of 
temporary contracts”: this index quantifies regulation of fixed-term and temporary work 
agency contracts with respect to the types of work for which these contracts are allowed 
and their duration. This measure also includes regulation governing the establishment 
and operation of temporary work agencies and requirements for agency workers to 
receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm, which can 
increase the cost of using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers on 
permanent contracts. It is important to note that employment protection refers here to 
only one dimension of the complex set of factors that influence labor market flexibility. 
These indices are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the 
use of temporary contracts.
21  
All these indices range between 0 (least restrictions) and 6 (most restrictions). Looking 
again at Table 6, different countries have different employment protection legislations. 
For example, when considering the policy “individual dismissal of workers with regular 
contracts”, one can see that countries like Portugal and to a lesser extent the Netherlands 
have stricter legislations while countries like the UK and Ireland have very weak ones. If 
we now look at the legislation on the “regulation of temporary contracts”, which is 
another important aspect of labor-market flexibility, again the UK and Ireland have very 
                                                      
20Observe that wage floors can exists even in absence of statutory minimum wages.  For example, in Sweden, there exist 
personal contracts which are concluded between individual employees and employers specifying such minimum rate. An 
employer who pays rates below the minima incurs liability for breach of the collective agreement concerned. However, these 
agreements largely vary between economic sectors and depend on employer characteristics. “Negotiated” wage floors are thus 
not considered here. 
21 For full details on the methodology and weights used to compile the indicators, go to: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/40/42740190.pdf.  
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weak legislations. This should not come as a surprise because these Anglo-Saxon 
countries are well-known to have very flexible labor markets. On the other hand, 
countries like Belgium and to a lesser extent Italy and France have much more regulated 
labor markets. More flexible labor markets (like in the UK or Ireland) should be, in 
principle, more favorable to immigrants because it gives them more chance to obtain a 
job. 
Finally, we consider “trade union density”, which corresponds to the ratio of wage and 
salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and 
salary earners (see Visser et al., 2010). Not surprisingly, Scandinavian countries have 
very high rates of trade union density (for example, 77.3 percent in Sweden) while 
countries like France, Spain and Germany have much lower rates (8 percent for France, 
15.5 for Spain and 22.2 for Germany), even though trade unions are very powerful. It is 
well documented that trade union mainly defend the interest of their workers and thus 
immigrants, who are often “outsiders”, tend to be disadvantaged compared to the 
natives, the “insiders” (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
Because of prejudices and discrimination, the main problem for immigrants is very 
likely to find a first job (whether they are new immigrants or second-generation 
immigrants) since once employed they can show their ability and thus, in principle, 
prejudices and discrimination should be lower. As a result, more flexible labor markets 
with lower minimum wages and lower trade-union density should be more favorable to 
immigrants because they allow them to find a first job more easily. In countries where 
the labor market is very rigid and trade union density very high, it is very difficult for 
immigrants to obtain a first job. Sweden, which has a very high trade-union density and 
a relatively rigid labor market, is a good example of such a case since immigrants have 





We will now use the MIPEX scores, our indicators of minimum wage, strictness of 
employment protection legislations and trade union density to understand how each of 
these different policies affects the probability of being employed and how their 
interaction with ethnic identity impacts on employment outcomes of immigrants. 
Specifically, focusing on the sample of immigrants only, we will assign to each 
individual the score of the country in which he/she resides in terms of the different 
policies.
 22  Our regression analysis results are contained in Tables 7 and 8.  
                                                      
22 Both the MIPEX index and our selected indicators of labor-market policies and conditions are not available for Ukraine. 
This country has thus been eliminated in our analysis on policy issues.   
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If we first look at the direct impact of integration policies on employment outcomes of 
immigrants, Table 7 shows that only “family reunion” policies seem to have a positive 
and significant impact on employment outcomes. However, when we interact these 
policy variables with the strength of ethnic identity, then we see that “labor-market 
access” policies seem to be beneficial in decreasing the penalty for those with a strong 
ethnic identity. This may confirm some theoretical mechanisms presented in Section 3. 
Indeed, if immigrants with a stronger ethnic identity are more likely to be discriminated 
against, then, in countries where the labor-market legislation protects immigrants against 
some type of discrimination, the employment prospects will be better for these 
immigrants. On the contrary, for the “family reunion” policy, which had a positive and 
significant impact on employment outcomes, the cross effect is negative. This could 
indicate that a richer network of social contacts in the host country (relatives and friends) 
might be helpful in finding a job (for example because it increases the information about 
job opportunities), but that such externalities are hampered when strong ethnic feelings 
are preserved.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
A more surprising result is the negative impact of “political participation” policies on 
immigrants’ employment prospects. This variable is certainly more “noisy” than other 
policy variables but it could be the case that allowing immigrants to participate to local 
elections triggers negative reactions from natives, which leads to more discrimination in 
the labor market. Interestingly, if we look at the cross effects, “political participation” is 
the only variable associated with a significant and positive one. This seems to suggest 
that this type of integration policies might positively affect the relationship between 
ethnic identity and employment probability, only for those immigrants who have an 
extreme identity.   
Let us now focus on labor-market policies, which are, in principle, “exogenous” to 
immigration patterns. The results are shown in Table 8 and confirm the intuition we had 
before. Indeed, more flexible labor markets are, in general, favorable to immigrants. One 
can see from Table 8 that most labor-market policy variables are associated with a 
negative estimated effect, although statistically significant only for “trade-union 
density”. In other words, more flexible labor markets that have a low trade-union density 
like the UK or Ireland are more favorable to immigrants in terms of employment. This is 
confirmed by Figure 1 where UK and Ireland have relatively high ratios of employment 
for the immigrants while Scandinavian countries have much lower ones. Interestingly, 
when we interact these labor-market policies with ethnic identity, all signs become 
positive, meaning that more regulated labor markets tend to alleviate the employment 
penalty of having a strong identity. In particular, the effect is statistical significant for 
minimum wage and employment protection regarding individual dismissal of workers 
with regular contracts.  This could be an indication that tough employment legislations 
reduce labor-market discrimination so that immigrants, even with stronger identity, are 
protected in terms of employment. So the general picture here is that more flexible labor  
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markets (like the UK and Ireland) could help immigrants to access the labor market but 
do not protect those who have a strong ethnic identity. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Lisbon Strategy (named after the European meeting in Lisbon in the spring of 
2000) states that by the year 2010, the EU shall become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, with the possibility of sustainable 
economic growth, with more and better work opportunities and a higher degree of social 
solidarity. It is crucial for the chances of EU reaching this goal that more people become 
employed. The problem is that many people are still outside the labor market, in 
particular those who have a foreign background. The integration of these individuals is 
thus crucial for reaching the Lisbon goals and European integration policy must play a 
more important role in Europe. The integration of citizens of third countries who live 
and work in the EU has therefore become an increasingly important issue in the last few 
years. During the council meetings (legal and domestic questions) in 2002, it was 
decided that a network of national contact points within the area of integration should be 
created and this was confirmed during the council meeting in June 2003 and the 
commission was appointed the task of creating yearly reports on migration and 
integration. In its message on immigration, integration and employment, the commission 
is trying to get an overall grip of the issue of integration. The first issue of the handbook 
on issues of integration for decision-makers and those who work with integration issues 
in practice was published in November 2004 (Handbook on Integration for policy-
makers and practitioners). Integration is a major issue within several of the EU policy 
areas. If there is a successful integration of immigrants on the labor market in an 
efficient and responsible way, this would be an important contribution to the Lisbon 
goal. 
There is thus a common agenda (or EU directive) for integration policy – a framework 
for the integration of citizens of third countries in the European Union – but there is no 
common  integration policy in Europe (Zenou, 2009). There is, however, a great 
willingness to carry out a common migration policy in Europe. Indeed, on October 16, 
2008, all presidents and prime ministers from the EU have signed the European pact for 
immigration and asylum which contains commitments within the following areas: legal 
immigration, illegal immigration and returning people, border control, asylum and 
partnership with third countries and the promotion of synergies between migration and 
development.  
In the present paper, we focus on an important aspect of the migration and integration 
policy in Europe: the labor-market outcomes of first and second generation immigrants. 
In particular, we analyze the relationship between ethnic identity and employment  
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outcomes of non-EU immigrants in Europe. As mentioned in the Introduction, the riots 
in France in November 2005 combined with the riots in England (in Oldham, Leeds, 
Burnley and Bradford) in the summer of 2001 had in common that most of the rioters 
belonged to ethnic minority groups: children of immigrants from Arab and African 
countries in France, young British Asian men in England. The common explanation put 
forward was the high unemployment rates experienced by these groups and their lack of 
cultural integration in their host country. It is therefore important to study if indeed there 
is a relationship between integration (where ethnic identity could measure some aspects 
of it) and labor-market outcomes of immigrants in Europe. 
Our results suggest that there is in fact a penalty to be paid in terms of employment for 
immigrants with a strong identity in Europe. To be more precise, a one standard 
deviation increase in our composite indicator of ethnic identity (encompassing 
attachment to religion, attachment to traditions and language spoken at home) is, on 
average, associated with an employment penalty of about 3.7 percent. Being a first 
generation immigrant leads to a penalty of about 17 percent while second-generation 
immigrants have a probability of being employed that is not statistically different from 
that of natives. These results seem to indicate an economic integration process of 
immigrants in Europe since second-generation immigrants have a higher probability of 
being employed than their parents and, compared to natives, there does not seem to be 
any difference in terms of employment. However, when they have a strong identity, 
second-generation immigrants have a lower chance of finding a job than natives.  
If we look more carefully at what drives these results in terms of ethnic identity, we 
find that speaking a language at home different than that of the majority is harmful in 
terms of employment. Moreover, a strong attachment to religion has also a negative 
impact on employment while a strong attachment to traditions and customs does not 
seem to play a significant role. This is not that surprising given the presence of a rather 
important Muslim population in Western European countries as a consequence of 
voluntary immigration of workers coming from the Middle East, North Africa or South 
Asia. 
Our analysis also reveals that integration and labor-market policies aiming at 
improving the employment prospects of non-European immigrants can be successful but 
their results vary depending on the strength of identity of the immigrants. We find that 
more flexible labor markets tend to be, in general, more favorable to immigrants. In 
particular, more flexible labor markets that have a low trade-union density like the UK 
or Ireland are more favorable to immigrants in terms of employment than, for example, 
Scandinavian countries that have more rigid labor markets. However, this is no longer 
the case if immigrants have a strong ethnic identity.  
In this respect, our analysis provides valuable insights into the political debate on 
immigration in Europe. Although we are fully aware that these issues are complex and 
other aspects are at work, our results suggest that a largely under-investigated issue, i.e. 
the relationship between ethnic identity and immigrants’ employment prospects, might 
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SwitzerlandTable 1: Share of the foreign-born in total population, labor force and employment (15 - 64 years old) 
Share in the total 
population    Share in the total 
labor force    Share in employment 
 
2002  2006  2002    2006   2002   2006 
Australia 26.6    27.6    24.7    25.7   24.7   25.6 
Austria 13.2    17.0    13.3    16.2   12.7   15.4 
Belgium 12.4    13.5    11.3    12.3   10.1   11.1 
Canada 18.4    19.8    19.9    21.2   19.8   - 
Czech Republic  2.0    2.0    1.9    1.9   1.8   1.8 
Denmark 6.7    7.1    5.7    6.0   5.5   5.8 
Finland 2.5    3.3    2.4    3.1   2.2   2.8 
France 12.4    12.5    11.7    12.0   11.0   11.2 
Germany 8.9    8.8    8.6    8.7   8.3   8.5 
Greece 6.4    7.6    7.4    8.3   7.2   8.3 
Hungary 1.3    1.7    1.3    1.7   1.4   1.8 
Ireland 9.3    13.1    9.5    13.9   9.4   13.7 
Italy 4.1    7.6    5.1    8.6   5.0   8.5 
Luxembourg 37.7    40.4    41.4    44.6   41.1   43.8 
Netherlands 13.1    12.8    11.3    11.0   11.0   10.3 
Norway 7.0    8.5    6.5    7.8   6.2   7.4 
Portugal 5.8    7.4    6.3    7.9   6.2   7.8 
Slovakia -    0.7    -    0.7   -  0.7 
Spain 6.8    13.6    7.8    15.1   7.6   14.6 
Sweden 14.0    14.9    12.4    13.5   11.7   12.5 
Switzerland -    26.1    -    25.4   -  24.4 
UK 9.7    11.8    8.8    11.2   8.6   11.0 
USA 14.8    15.6    14.7    15.7   14.6   15.8 
Sources:  European countries: European Union Labour Force Survey (data provided by Eurostat) and census of population 2001, for Italy; Australia: 
Labour Force Survey; Canada: 2001 and 2006 population censuses; United States: Current Population Survey, March supplement. 
 Table 2: Immigrant to native identity, employment and education gap 
by region of origin and generation  
Whole sample 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Identity  Education  Employment 
 1
st Gen.  2
nd Gen 1
st Gen.  2
nd Gen 1
st Gen.  2
nd Gen 
Africa 1.7438***  0.2829***  -1.1801**  0.3994*  -0.2666***  -0.0713** 
 (0.1088)  (0.0703)  (0.5215)  (0.2198)  (0.0534)  (0.0315) 
Asia 1.6034***  0.3145***  -0.8461*  0.3392  -0.2627***  -0.0002 
 (0.1113)  (0.0815)  (0.5042)  (0.2422)  (0.0534)  (0.0382) 
North America  0.9158***  -0.0156  2.6080***  0.7378  -0.2380***  -0.0297 
 (0.1897)  (0.1328)  (0.7774)  (0.4888)  (0.0753)  (0.0650) 
South America & Caribbean  1.0625***  0.0534  -0.8259*  0.2739  -0.0682  -0.0186 
 (0.1075)  (0.1002)  (0.4763)  (0.3613)  (0.0561)  (0.0521) 
Australasia 0.7540***  -0.0446  -0.6349  1.3305*  -0.0430  -0.0276 
 (0.2122)  (0.1948)  (0.9387)  (0.7901)  (0.1378)  (0.1615) 









































            
Host country dummies  yes  yes  yes 
            
Observations 77,556  84,361  84,004 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.216  0.925  0.179 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var.: Strength of ethnic identity; OLS estimates and  robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported (2) Dep. Var.: Probability to 
be in paid work; Probit marginal effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported (3) Dep. Var.: Years of full-time education 
completed; OLS estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3: Ethnic Identity, Employment and Education 
  (i)  Employment  (ii)  Education 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
  Whole sample  Only Immigrants  Whole sample  Only Immigrants 
        
Ethnic identity  -0.0068**  -0.0372**  -0.1845***  -0.6972*** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0159)  (0.0206)  (0.1391) 
First generation  -0.1722**  -  0.4275  - 
 (0.0734)    (0.7512)   
Second generation  -0.0630  0.1540**  0.7792  -0.4794 
 (0.0522)  (0.0624)  (0.6129)  (0.5384) 
First generation* Ethnic identity  -0.0163  -  -0.4751***  - 
 (0.0157)    (0.1385)   
Second generation* Ethnic identity  -0.0344*  -0.0201  -0.1352  0.3333* 
 (0.0191)  (0.0247)  (0.1234)  (0.1833) 
        
Age 0.0972***  0.1008***  0.2716***  0.2655*** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0063)  (0.0072)  (0.0429) 
Age2 -0.0012***  -0.0012***  -0.0039***  -0.0033*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0006) 
Female -0.2038***  -0.2123***  -0.1929***  -0.0754 
 (0.0051)  (0.0251)  (0.0355)  (0.2096) 
Years since arrival  0.0200  0.0283*  0.0520  -0.1834 
 (0.0137)  (0.0155)  (0.1278)  (0.1334) 
Education 0.0195***  0.0106***  -  - 
 (0.0008)  (0.0030)     
        
Region of origin dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Host country dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
        
Observations 77,291  2,892  77,556  2,904 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.177  0.185  0.928  0.905 
Notes: (i) Probit estimation  results. Marginal effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. (ii) OLS estimation results. Coefficient 
estimates and  robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 4: Different Dimensions of Ethnic Identity, Employment and Education 
– Immigrant sample- 
(i) Employment  (ii) Education 
  
    
Importance of religion  -0.0650*  -0.1561 
 (0.0353)  (0.3069) 
Attachment to traditions  -0.0248  -0.9633*** 
 (0.0404)  (0.3274) 
Language spoken at home  -0.0703*  -1.3617*** 
 (0.0384)  (0.3416) 
Second generation  0.1591**  -0.8347 
 (0.0764)  (0.6554) 
Second generation* Importance of religion  -0.0533  -0.3840 
 (0.0573)  (0.4378) 
Second generation* Attachment to traditions  0.0073  0.5615 
 (0.0601)  (0.4524) 
Second generation* Language spoken at home  -0.0182  1.1275* 
 (0.0965)  (0.6301) 
    
Age 0.1011***  0.2686*** 
 (0.0063)  (0.0428) 
Age2 -0.0012***  -0.0034*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0006) 
Female -0.2120***  -0.1292 
 (0.0252)  (0.2092) 
Years since arrival  0.0257*  -0.1948 
 (0.0155)  (0.1335) 
Education 0.0106***   
 (0.0031)   
    
Region of origin dummies  yes  yes 
Host country dummies  yes  yes 
    
Observations 2,892  2,904 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.187  0.906 
Notes: (i) Probit estimation  results. Marginal effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. (ii) OLS estimation results. 
Coefficient estimates and  robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Table 5: Robustness check: Ethnic Identity and Employment 
2SLS – Immigrant sample- 
 
First stage results  Dep. Var.: Strength of 
Ethnic Identity  
  Second  stage results  Dep. Var.: Probability to 
be in paid work 
        
Country of origin ethnic identity  0.8945***    Ethnic Identity  -0.0879* 
 (0.1692)      (0.0470) 
        
Age 0.0089    Age  0.0885*** 
 (0.0133)      (0.0037) 
Age2 -0.0001    Age2  -0.0011*** 
 (0.0002)      (0.0000) 
Education -0.0337***    Education  0.0068* 
 (0.0062)      (0.0036) 
Female 0.1634***    Second  generation  0.0626 
 (0.0529)      (0.0839) 
Second generation  -1.1347***    Years since arrival  0.0147 
 (0.1243)      (0.0128) 
Years since arrival  -0.1454 ***    Female  -0.1667*** 
 (0.0312)      (0.0273) 
        
Host country dummies  yes    Host country dummies  yes 
        
F test  22.16   Obs.  2,892 
 R-squared  0.1651    R-squared  0.216 
        
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 6: European countries by policy types (year 2004) 
  Immigrant focused policies (MIPEX by policy areas) (1)  General labour market policies and conditions (2) 




























Austria 45  34  55  34  22  42  0  3.25  2.37  1.5  34.1 
Belgium 75  61  74  57  71  75  0.51  4.13  1.73  2.63  52.9 
Denmark 40  36  67  55  33  33  0  3.88  1.63  1.38  71.7 
Finland 70  68  65  81  44  75  0  2.63  2.17  1.88  73.3 
France 50  45  48  52  54  81  0.61  2.13  2.47  3.63  8 
Germany 50  61  53  66  38  50  0  3.75  3  1.25  22.2 
Greece 40  41  60  14  25  58  0.46  3.25  2.33  3.13  23.7 
Hungary 40  50  50  29  36  85  0.48  2.88  1.92  1.13  18.2 
Ireland 50  50  39  59  62  58  0.53  2.38  1.6  0.63  35.7 
Italy 85  79  67  55  33  69  0  4.88  1.77  1.88  33.9 
Luxembourg 45 50 48 84 45  56 0.41  ..  ..  ..  42.1 
Netherlands 70  59  66  80  51 81 0.45  3  3.05  1.19  21.3 
Norway 70  66  72  86  39  54  0  2.88  2.25  2.88  55 
Poland 25  66  67  14  45  46  0.43  3.63  2.06  1.75  17.4 
Portugal 90  84  67  79  69  87  0.48  2.88  4.17  2.75  18.7 
Spain 90  66  70  50  41  50  0.42  3.13  2.46  3.5  15.5 
Sweden 100  92  76  93  71  94  0  3.75  2.86  1.63  77.3 
Switzerland 75  43  51  55  44 33  0  3.88  1.16  1.13  19.6 
United Kingdom  60  61  67  46  62  81  0.43  2.88  1.12  0.38  28.8 
Sources:   (1) Migrant Integration Policy Index  (available on line http://www.integrationindex.eu/) 
(2) OECD Labour Force Statistics (available on line: http://stats.oecd.org) 
 Table 7: Ethnic Identity, Employment and Integration Policies 
Probit estimation results – Immigrant sample-  
Dep. Var.: Probability to be in paid work 
   
Ethnic Identity  -0.1298*** 
 (0.0424) 
Access to nationality    -0.0023 
 (0.0017) 
Labor market access  0.0007 
 (0.0011) 
Family reunion  0.0053*** 
 (0.0013) 
Long term residence  0.0004 
 (0.0015) 




Ethnic Identity * Access to nationality    -0.0002 
 (0.0017) 
Ethnic Identity * Labor market access  0.0020*** 
 (0.0007) 
Ethnic Identity * Family reunion  -0.0025** 
 (0.0012) 
Ethnic Identity * Long term residence  0.0009 
 (0.0009) 
Ethnic Identity * Political participation  0.0017*** 
 (0.0006) 
Ethnic Identity * Anti-discrimination  -0.0004 
 (0.0011) 
   










Years since arrival  0.0273* 
 (0.0149) 
   
Region of origin dummies  yes 
   
Observations 2,879 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.188 
Notes: Marginal effects and  standard errors clustered at the country (of destination) level (in parentheses) are reported.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 8: Ethnic Identity, Employment and Labor-Market Policies 
Probit estimation results – Immigrant sample-  
Dep. Var.: Probability to be in paid work 
   
Ethnic Identity  -0.2261*** 
 (0.0736) 
Minimum wage relative to median wage  -0.0149 
 (0.1322) 
EPL- Collective dismissals  0.0708 
 (0.0440) 
EPL- Regular contract  -0.0301 
 (0.0275) 
EPL- Temporary contracts  -0.0005 
 (0.0185) 
Trade Union density  -0.0022** 
 (0.0009) 
Ethnic Identity * Minimum wage relative to median wage  0.0730* 
 (0.0407) 
Ethnic Identity * EPL- Collective dismissals  0.0203 
 (0.0274) 
Ethnic Identity * EPL- Regular contract  0.0319** 
 (0.0127) 
Ethnic Identity * EPL- Temporary contracts  0.0049 
 (0.0098) 
Ethnic Identity * Trade Union density  0.0006 
 (0.0007) 
   










Years since arrival  0.0130 
 (0.0166) 
   
Region of origin dummies  yes 
   
Observations 2,836 
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.181 
Notes: Marginal effects and  standard errors clustered at the country (of destination) level (in parentheses) are reported.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 